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Abstract: The claim that oil wealth tends to block democratic transitions has recently 
been challenged by Haber and Menaldo (2011), who argue that past studies were tainted 
by endogeneity and omitted variable bias.  Using historical data going back to 1800, and 
models with country and year fixed effects, they conclude there is no evidence of a 
‘resource curse.’  We revisit their data and models, and show they are only correct for 
the period from 1800 to the 1970s: since about 1980, there has been a pronounced 
resource curse.  We argue that oil wealth only became a hindrance to democratic 
transitions after the transformative events of the 1970s, which dramatically increased the 
economic importance of oil, and enabled developing country governments to capture the 
oil rents that were previously siphoned off by foreign-owned firms.  We also explain why 
the Haber-Menaldo study failed to identify this: partly because the authors draw invalid 
inferences from their longitudinal analysis of resource-rich states; and partly because 
they assume that the relationship between oil wealth and democracy has not changed for 
the last 200 years.  
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Many studies have found that authoritarian countries with more oil wealth are less likely 
to transition to democracy.  Haber and Menaldo (2011) challenge these studies, arguing 
they are tainted by reverse causality and omitted variable bias.  Using new data on natural 
resource wealth for the years 1800-2006, and statistical models that control for country 
fixed effects and many other factors, they find no evidence to support the “resource 
curse” claim.  They conclude that: 
No matter how we look at the long-run data – including just making simple 
country-by-country graphs – we cannot find a systematic tendency that matches 
the concept of a resource curse (3).1 
The Haber-Menaldo article has had a powerful impact on the resource curse 
debate, calling into question widely-held beliefs about the politically malignant effects of 
petroleum wealth.  In the first eighteen months after its February 2011 publication, it was 
cited more than 100 times by other scholars, and featured in influential policy journals 
(Kenny 2010), World Bank publications (Sinnot, Nash, and de la Torre 2010; Barma et 
al. 2011), and prominent blogs as evidence that claims about the ‘resource curse’ are 
false.2  An earlier study by Gurses (2009) used a similar fixed-effects model and came to 
a similar conclusion. 
                                                
1 Although the term ‘resource curse’ can refer to many different phenomena, we follow 
Haber and Menaldo in using this term to refer to the hypothesis that countries with 
greater oil wealth are less likely to transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.  Like 
Haber and Menaldo, we focus on the effects of oil and natural gas – which make up over 
90 percent of the world minerals trade – rather than nonfuel minerals.   
2 The Haber-Menaldo study was featured on the Freakonomics blog on April 4, 2011, and 
The Monkey Cage blog on August 23, 2011.  The number of citations is from a ‘Google 
Scholar’ search on April 10, 2012. 
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Why do these findings differ so much from other recent studies, which conclude 
that there is a resource curse?3  We employ the Haber-Menaldo data and models and 
show that each side of the debate is partly correct: from 1800 to the 1970s – the period 
that dominates the Haber-Menaldo dataset – there is no strong evidence of a resource 
curse.  Yet since the late 1970s – the period that is the focus of most other studies – oil 
wealth has strongly inhibited democratization.   
The emergence of a resource curse – or more properly, a petroleum curse – in the 
late 1970s is consistent with a closer look at the history of the global oil industry.  
Although the Haber-Menaldo analysis begins in 1800, no country produced economically 
significant quantities of oil before 1918.4  Until the late 1960s, most of the rents 
generated by oil production in non-Western countries were captured by a handful of 
large, vertically-integrated international oil companies – sometimes called “the Seven 
Sisters.” 5  But in the 1970s, the industry was transformed by a wave of nationalizations 
and contract revisions that enabled the governments of host countries to seize control of 
these rents.  We refer to this transformation as “the big oil change.” 
Theories of the “rentier state” were formulated, beginning in the mid-1980s, in 
response to the big oil change; the idea that the oil producers were afflicted by a ‘resource 
                                                
3 Aslaksen (2010), Ramsay (2011), Tsui (2010), Cuaresma, Oberhofer, and Raschky 
(2010), Andersen and Aslaksen (forthcoming), Ross (2012). 
4 According to the Haber-Menaldo data, in 1918, Mexico became the first country to 
produce $100 per capita worth of oil.  By 2006, 49 countries were producing at least $100 
per capita of oil (constant dollars). 
5 The seven companies were Standard Oil of New Jersey (later Exxon), Standard Oil of 
California (later Chevron), Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later BP), Mobil, Texaco, Gulf, 
and Royal Dutch Shell.  
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curse’ began to circulate in the early to mid 1990s.6   In both literatures, the central 
concern is what happens to a country’s politics and economy when the state accumulates 
large resource rents – a condition that only became widely true in the 1970s. The Haber-
Menaldo study, however, combines data from 175 years when governments did not 
typically capture most of these oil rents (from 1800 to about 1975), with data from about 
30 years when they did capture them.  The powerful anti-democratic effects of oil since 
the late 1970s are hence obscured by the weaker relationship between oil and democracy 
in the 1800-1975 period.  
We use Haber and Menaldo’s data and error-correction model to illustrate this 
change.  When we allow for a break in the effect of oil around 1980, we find that oil has 
strongly inhibited democratization in the post-break period. This result holds in the 
presence of country and year fixed effects, and under a wide range of conditions: with 
each of the variables that Haber and Menaldo use to measure resource wealth; when we 
use a dynamic fixed effects model in place of Haber and Menaldo’s error correction 
model (ECM); and when we use any year between 1982 and 1990 to identify the 
temporal break. We also show that when oil income is allowed to affect regime types 
over three, five, or seven years, rather than a single year, these anti-democratic effects 
become much larger and emerge earlier.  
Haber and Menaldo claim that their finding of ‘no resource curse’ is also 
supported by other evidence – particularly their longitudinal analysis of 53 resource-
                                                
6 The earliest modern study of the ‘rentier state’ was published by Mahdavy in 1970, and 
focuses largely on Iran.  Little else was written on the topic before the late 1987, when 
Luciani and Beblawi edited a seminal volume.  The term ‘resource curse’ dates to a study 
by Richard Auty in 1993, and was popularized by a 1995 paper by Jeffrey Sachs and 
Andrew Warner. 
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reliant states.  They report that most of these countries eventually became more 
democratic, even though they had been ‘treated’ with resource wealth.  This leads them to 
conclude that 45 of these 53 states were either ‘resource blessed’ or unaffected by 
resource wealth, while just eight of them might have been ‘resource cursed.’ 
We show that Haber and Menaldo’s inferences from these data are invalid: it is 
not possible to determine whether a given treatment (oil wealth) has had an effect by only 
observing countries that have been treated.  To make valid inferences about a treatment, 
researchers must compare outcomes in the treated population to outcomes in a control 
population. Haber and Menaldo observe that countries treated with oil wealth have grown 
slightly more democratic over time, and interpret this as evidence against the resource 
curse.  We show, however, that the oil states examined by Haber and Menaldo (the 
treated group) made much less progress towards democracy than the non-oil states (the 
control group).  In other words, once we employ the correct counterfactual, we observe 
that the ‘oil treatment’ strongly inhibited democratization.7 
Despite our criticisms, there is also much we admire about the Haber Menaldo 
study. They have offered a smart and spirited challenge to a well-established (but not 
always rigorous) literature; they have gathered a large quantity of new historical data, and 
made their data public and transparent; and they have helpfully clarified some of the 
conditions under which resource wealth is not associated with less democracy.  Yet their 
study obscures the powerful effect that oil revenues have had on authoritarian rule over 
                                                
7 There is another important reason that Haber and Menaldo fail to identify a resource 
curse: they decline to test the most credible version of the resource curse hypothesis, 
which is that when autocratic states collect a lot of oil revenues, they become less likely 
to transit to democracy (e.g., Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007; Papaioannou and Siourounis 
2008; Ross 2009; Morrison 2009; Andersen and Aslaksen 2013, Clark, Poast, and Weins 
2012). 
 6 
the last three decades – the period of greatest concern for most researchers and 
policymakers. 
Our findings have important implications for the study of both the resource curse, 
and democratic transitions more broadly.  Virtually all of the resource curse literature 
assumes that the malignant (or benign) effects of petroleum wealth have changed little 
over time; some studies draw explicit parallels between the influence of oil today and 
other resources in the past (e.g., Karl 1997).  More generally, studies of democracy have 
increasingly employed historical data to identify the factors associated with democratic 
transitions (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared 2009; Boix 2011; Freeman and 
Quinn 2012).   
A key assumption in most of this research is that the correlates of democracy are 
constant over time; if this were true, datasets that cover longer periods of time should 
give scholars more leverage to identify these correlates.  But if causal relationships tend 
to change over time, the identification of short or medium term causal effects in one era 
might tell us little about their salience in a different era.  Our study shows that the causal 
effect of at least one important factor – petroleum wealth – on democratic transitions 
changed sharply from the 1960s to the 1980s, as the global distribution of petroleum rents 
shifted from firms to governments.  We hope our analysis encourages scholars who use 
long datasets to study the resource curse, democratization, and other social and political 
phenomena to become more sensitive to changing historical patterns, including 
discontinuities in economic and political relationships. 
The next section of this paper uses simple graphs and cross-tabs to illustrate our 
argument that oil wealth only began to inhibit democratic transitions after the 1970s. 
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Section two suggests this was probably caused by the wave of nationalizations that swept 
the oil-producing world in the 1970s.  In section three we begin our analysis of the 
Haber-Menaldo results, focusing on their longitudinal analysis of resource-rich countries; 
we explain why their inferences from these data are logically flawed.  We replicate Haber 
and Menaldo’s core statistical results in section four, and show how they are altered once 
we account for a temporal break in the effect of oil in the late 1970s or early 1980s.  
Section five shows that these results are robust.  Our paper concludes by reflecting on the 
implications of the ‘big oil change’ of the 1970s, and the methodological issues raised by 
the Haber-Menaldo study.  
  
1. Looking at oil and democracy over time  
Most studies of the resource curse rely on datasets that begin in 1960 or 1970; Haber and 
Menaldo construct a dataset that goes back much earlier – for some of their variables, to 
1800.  They argue that this unusually long time-series allows them to identify the long-
run equilibrium relationship between natural resources and regime type. 
Yet most of the years in the Haber and Menaldo dataset are uninformative: 
between 1800 and 1860, no country produced a single barrel of oil; and until the 1940s, 
only a couple of countries – chiefly the US, Venezuela, and Mexico – produced 
economically significant quantities.  Figure 1 shows that the number of countries 
producing significant quantities of oil – which we define as $100 per capita (in constant 
2007 dollars) – over the 207 year period covered by their data.  In 2006, there were 49 
such countries.  Yet no country crossed this modest threshold before 1918; as late as 
1949, there were just four significant oil producers.   
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Moreover, using a very long time series – even when time-series and cross-
national observations are pooled, as in about half of the Haber-Menaldo models – has an 
important drawback: it can open the door to misleading inferences, if the relationship 
between the independent and dependent variables has changed over time. 
There is good reason to suspect that the relationship between oil and regime types 
has indeed changed over time.  In Figure 2 we plot the mean polity scores of the oil-
abundant countries and compare them to all other states.8  While the polity scores of the 
oil countries was slightly below the score of the non-oil countries for most of this period, 
they seem to diverge sometime in the early 1980s.  Both sets of countries became more 
democratic after 1976, but the non-oil countries moved further and faster towards 
democracy. 
Of course, this figure may be suspect because the composition of both sets of 
countries changes over time: more countries are becoming sovereign, increasing the 
membership of both groups; and countries shift between ‘oil abundant’ and ‘not oil 
abundant’ when they discover or run out of oil, and when global oil prices rise or fall.  
Figure 3 shows a simple way to circumvent this problem: it compares the polity scores of 
two constant groups of countries – the eleven states that produced at least 100 constant 
dollars per capita in oil income in 1960, and continued to be significant producers 
                                                
8 Note we are not looking at country’s oil dependence (meaning the ratio of oil exports to 
GDP), but its oil abundance (meaning the value of a country’s oil and gas production 
divided by its population).  As many scholars have pointed out, measures of oil 
dependence are biased upwards in poor countries, making it a poor measure of resource 
wealth (Ross 2004, 2009; Dunning 2008).  We once again define ‘oil abundant’ countries 
as those whose oil income exceeded $100 dollars per capita (in constant 2007 dollars) in 
a given year. 
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throughout this period, and the remaining 107 states that were also sovereign in 1960.9 
Now the divergence between the two lines is sharper, and appears to start in the late 
1970s.  In the Appendix, we demonstrate that the results do not change if we move our 
base year from 1960 to 1970 (Figure A1), or if we raise the threshold for identifying ‘oil 
producers’ from $100 to $500 dollars (Figure A2).10 
We can also see the temporal break with simple cross-tabulations, by comparing 
the rate of democratic transitions (still using the Haber Menaldo data) among countries 
that produce at least 100 dollars in oil income, compared to everyone else (Table 1, top 
half).  Over the whole 203 year period covered by the Haber Menaldo data (row one), 
there is no statistically significant difference between the oil producers and the non-oil 
producers.  The similarity of these two numbers is the basis of much of the Haber-
Menaldo analysis. 
Since production was minimal in all but a few countries before 1940, we think it 
is more enlightening to focus on the period between 1940 and 2002 (which is the last year 
in the Haber-Menaldo data containing their dichotomous measure of regime types).  
From 1940 to 1980 (row two), oil producers and non-oil producers had democratic 
transitions at almost exactly the same rate; after 1980 (row three), the non-oil producers 
became democratic at more than twice the rate of the oil producers.  If we move the 
threshold for identifying oil producers up to $500 (Table 1, bottom half), the patterns are 
                                                
9 The eleven oil producers are Bahrain, Canada, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Trinidad, United States, and Venezuela. 
10 Using 1970 as the base year yields 16 significant oil producers: Algeria, Bahrain, 
Canada, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Russia (Soviet Union), Saudi 
Arabia, Trinidad, United States, the United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.  Moving the 
threshold to $500 in 1970 creates a group of 11 countries: Bahrain, Gabon, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.  
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even stronger: since 1980, the non-oil producers have been five times more likely to 
transit than the oil producers.   
In short, both a visual inspection of the historical data, and simple cross-
tabulations, suggests that the democracy paths of oil-producers and non-oil producers 
diverged sometime in the late 1970s or early 1980s. 
 
2. Historical Change in International Oil Markets 
Why did this occur?  Most theories of the resource curse argue that oil helps prolong 
authoritarian rule because it generates large rents for the government, which the ruler can 
use to both lower taxes and increase patronage and pork barrel spending (e.g., Mahdavy 
1970, Luciani 1987, Ross 2001).  But governments have not always been able to capture 
these rents.  Before the 1970s, the global petroleum industry was dominated by a handful 
of vertically-integrated companies that colluded to maintain control of world supplies 
(Yergin 1991).  In all but a few countries, these firms owned or controlled the local 
subsidiaries that extracted and exported the host country’s oil.  Globally, they controlled 
the shipping and marketing of almost all of the world’s petroleum, and used both highly-
favorable contracts and transfer pricing to capture most of the rents for themselves 
(Hartshorn 1962, Levy 1982). 
In the 1960s and 1970s, international petroleum markets were transformed by a 
series of closely-related developments: oil supplies begin to grow tighter, as rising 
demand outpaced new discoveries; the major oil exporters of the developing world began 
to collude through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); the 
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates – which had helped keep prices stable – 
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fell apart; and global energy markets were shaken by the 1973-74 and 1978-79 price 
shocks (Tetreault 1985). 
These events signaled – and helped precipitate – a profound shift in the 
relationships between international oil firms, and the governments of oil-rich countries. 
As economic historian Edith Penrose wrote in 1976,  
Exploration and production concessions granted in the early days have been 
repeatedly re-negotiated, invariably in favour of the countries; where the 
concessions covered a very large proportion of a country’s drilling area, they have 
been reduced in size; stiffer regulations respecting drilling requirements, reservoir 
maintenance and similar matters have been introduced; and financial 
arrangements of all kinds have improved in favour of the countries.11 
Perhaps the most important change during this period was nationalization: almost 
all oil-exporting countries in the developing world seized the assets of foreign oil 
companies.  Some states, like Ecuador, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, established 
new state-owned enterprises to manage these assets; others, like Iraq, placed them under 
pre-existing but moribund state-owned companies.  From the 1960s to the late 1970s, the 
number of nationalizations rose, culminating in the 1973-1976 period (Figure 4).  Even 
countries that were reluctant to use expropriation were able to strike better deals with 
foreign oil companies, who were anxious to placate resource nationalists.  According to 
Kobrin (1980, 17), “the net result was a revolutionary transformation of the international 
petroleum industry.”12 
                                                
11 Penrose (1976), 198. 
12 Also see Jodice (1980); Tetreault (1985); Yergin (1991); Minor (1994); Victor, Hults, 
and Thurber (2011). 
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These events led to sharp changes in the finances of most oil-producing states: the 
size of government revenues grew dramatically; they became more fiscally reliant on 
their petroleum sectors; and instead of collecting taxes and royalties from foreign 
companies, governments could fund themselves by selling oil through their national oil 
companies.  Many rulers also used their national oil companies to gain greater control 
over the distribution of patronage, and to cloak these transactions in secrecy (Ross 
2012).13  Collectively, these developments gave the governments of oil-producing 
countries far more influence over their economies and citizens.  We think – though 
cannot prove, in the absence of more reliable nationalization data – that when the fiscal 
powers of autocratically-governed oil producers passed a critical threshold in the mid to 
late 1970s, they became capable of withstanding the democratic wave that swept the rest 
of the authoritarian world in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Most of Haber and Menaldo’s statistical tests refute the hypothesis – which they 
attribute to the resource curse literature – that there is a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between a country’s resource wealth in one year, and its democracy level the following 
year.  Since they find no such long-run equilibrium between 1800 and 2006, they 
conclude there is no resource curse: 
A reader who accepts the results of the cointegration tests has to conclude that 
there is no resource curse, because they indicate that there is not a long-term 
equilibrium relationship between Fiscal Reliance and Polity (15).” 
Yet if history matters, these variables should not be cointegrated.  A long run equilibrium 
would imply that the world of oil and politics has not changed over the last two centuries 
                                                
13  According to one study, expropriations raised the government’s share of oil profits 
from 50 percent in the early 1960s to 98 percent by 1974 (Mommer 2002). 
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– and that the historic shift in the control of resource rents in the 1970s was politically 
inconsequential.  
 
3. Haber and Menaldo’s Longitudinal Analysis 
We begin our examination of the Haber-Menaldo data by looking at their longitudinal 
analysis of 53 resource-reliant countries, which takes up about half of their study.14  They 
explain their strategy by correctly pointing out that the resource curse is a theory about 
changes that occur within countries over time.  Since cross-national comparisons can be 
tainted by omitted variable bias, they argue, “it is best to employ evidence and methods 
designed to see whether that time series process actually occurred (2).” 
In pursuit of this goal, they identify 53 ‘resource reliant’ countries, and look for 
evidence that fluctuations in each country’s resource income (or alternatively, its ‘fiscal 
reliance’ on resource revenues) were followed by corresponding fluctuations in their 
Polity scores.  They first conduct a ‘graphical analysis’ of each country (meaning that 
they plot and visually inspect graphs), and report that resource wealth seems to be 
negatively correlated with Polity scores – as predicted by the resource curse – in just 
eight of the 53 countries.  They observe positive correlations – which they call evidence 
of a “resource blessing” – in 19 other countries, and report no conclusive pattern in the 
remaining 26 countries (pp. 5-11). 
Haber and Menaldo follow this with a statistical analysis of the 18 countries for 
which they have collected data on ‘fiscal reliance,’ using ECM-based cointegration tests 
– first running tests on each country individually (pp 11-14), then all 18 countries as a 
                                                
14 These tests make up 24 of the 55 statistical tests reported in their tables, all of their 18 
graphs, and about half of the article’s written pages. 
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panel (pp. 14-18).  They conclude that “no matter how one looks at the relationship 
between Fiscal Reliance and Polity, there is no evidence for a resource curse (15)”.  
According to Haber and Menaldo, this within-country analysis helps solve the 
problem of omitted variable bias: 
By focusing on variance over time within countries, we have addressed the 
problem of time-invariant omitted variable bias.  To put it concretely, we are 
implicitly comparing Venezuela to itself over time in order to see whether 
increases in its resource reliance explain lower levels of Polity (23).   
Yet their reasoning is flawed: their analysis can only tell us the conditional 
probability that a country with more (or less) resource wealth will democratize; the 
important question, however, is whether resource-rich countries are more likely, or less 
likely, to democratize than similar countries without resource wealth.  
The fallacy can be described in experimental terms: it is not possible to make 
valid inferences about the effects of any treatment without comparing the treated group to 
a control group.  Haber and Menaldo compare countries ‘treated’ with natural resource 
wealth to themselves over time, instead of comparing them to countries without resource 
wealth.  Since they find that when countries are ‘treated’ with resource wealth, they do 
not become less democratic, they mistakenly infer that the treatment had no effect.  But if 
they compared the resource-producing countries to the control group – the non-resource 
countries, which happened to grow substantially more democratic after the 1970s – they 
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would have  observed that the “resource treatment”, and in particular oil, has had a 
profound anti-democratic effect.15 
We can illustrate our point with a simple graph.  In Figure 5, the solid line 
represents the mean Polity score of Haber and Menaldo’s 34 oil-reliant states (using their 
0-100 scale), between 1945 and 2006.16  If we only observe these oil-reliant states – 
which were being collectively treated by large revenue windfalls in the 1970s – Haber 
and Menaldo appear to be correct: these countries became collectively more democratic 
after the mid-1970s, which at first glance looks like evidence against the notion of a 
resource curse.  This appears to be consistent with their classification of these states as 
more often “blessed” than “cursed” by oil wealth.17  
Yet we cannot make inferences about the effects of a treatment until we observe 
the control group – the non-oil countries, whose mean Polity score is shown in Figure 5 
by the broken line.  Notice that there are two differences between the two lines: the level 
of democracy is much lower in the oil states; and since around 1980, the gap between the 
two groups has widened. 
                                                
15 The experimental analogy highlights a further problem with the Haber-Menaldo 
analysis: the discovery and production of oil is not a one-time ‘treatment’ that lasts for a 
short period, thereby allowing us to observe a country both ‘before’ and ‘after’ treatment.  
Most countries in the Haber-Menaldo sample discovered oil or other minerals and 
remained significant producers through the remaining years in the dataset, making it 
impossible to observe them post-treatment. 
16 Recent studies find that oil wealth, but not other types of mineral wealth, are associated 
with less frequent democratic transitions (e.g., Ross 2009).  Conflating oil producers with 
mineral producers may hence obscure oil’s anti-democratic effects. 
Here and elsewhere we use Haber and Menaldo’s data, which they generously 
shared with us. 
17 Among the 34 oil-producing states on their list, they classify 11 as ‘resource blessed,’ 
three as ‘resource cursed,’ and the remaining 20 as ‘neither blessed nor cursed (6).’ 
 16 
Haber and Menaldo’s within-country analyses might be more informative if they 
wanted to test the claim that changes in resource reliance led to changes in Polity scores.  
But as Haber and Menaldo themselves note, the resource curse is not a theory about 
changes, but about levels:  
The resource curse is a theory about variables expressed in levels: higher levels of 
natural resource reliance are purported to induce lower levels of democracy; 
lower levels of natural resource reliance within countries over time are purported 
to induce higher levels of democracy (11). 
Conceivably, democracy levels in Haber and Menaldo’s oil-reliant states might be 
lower due to omitted variable bias – which is why we prefer to look at oil abundance 
instead of oil reliance, and generally favor the use of country level fixed effects in 
regressions.  It is harder to identify, however, an omitted variable that might explain why 
the oil and non-oil states diverged after the 1970s. 
 
4. Accounting for change in the Haber Menaldo model 
Haber and Menaldo’s findings are significantly altered once we account for the historic 
changes of the 1970s. We use Haber and Menaldo’s data and error correction models to 
illustrate. 
In Table 2, Column 1, we replicate Haber and Menaldo’s core error correction 
model (found in their Table 5, column 1), in which their independent variable is Total Oil 
Income (measured in thousands of constant US dollars per capita), their dependent 
variable is a country’s normalized Polity score (ranging from 0-100), and their data cover 
163 countries from 1800 to 2006.  We use their data and their controls, including time 
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and country fixed effects, a lagged measure of Polity to capture endogenous dynamics (or 
error correction), and measures of income per capita, population, civil war, and both the 
regional and global diffusion of democracy.  Like them, we employ Discroll-Kray 
standard errors to account for spatial heterogeneity.18  Our results match theirs precisely: 
as they report, the coefficient on the Total Oil Income variable has a positive sign and is 
statistically significant.  They interpret this as implying that there is no resource curse, 
and maybe even a resource blessing. 
In column 2 we add terms interacting their Total Oil Income variables with a 
dummy for the post-1980 period, which takes the value 0 for the years 1800 to 1980 and 
1 for the years 1981-2006.19  The term interacting Total Oil Income with the post-1980 
period has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level in a 
two-tailed t-test.  In columns 3 and 4, we repeat this exercise using Haber and Menaldo’s 
Fiscal Reliance variable in place of Total Oil Income.  We consider these tests less 
informative because the sample is limited to the 18 countries for which Haber and 
Menaldo collected data, and their Fiscal Reliance variable fails to capture much of oil’s 
“rentier effect.”20  We nonetheless observe a similar pattern.  After replicating the 
                                                
18 Haber and Menaldo’s willingness to make their data and log file public is exemplary, 
and we thank them for their graciousness in answering our questions. 
19 We expect that the beginning of the period in which oil impeded democratic transitions 
varied from country to country, depending on the relationships between governments and 
international companies.  The transfer of rents often took place over a five or ten year 
period, as governments gradually gained control over foreign assets, renegotiated or 
abrogated contracts, reorganized existing national oil companies or established new ones, 
and developed new regulations.  This makes it hard to identify a single year when the 
salient dimensions of nationalization took place – which is why we decline to use 
country-specific measures of nationalization.  For more on the nationalization process, 
see Kobrin (1980), Mahdavi (2011). 
20 Prevailing theories of the resource curse suggest oil wealth can strengthen authoritarian 
regimes through at least two pathways: by allowing rulers to reduce taxation, and to 
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original Haber Menaldo model in column 3, we add the interaction terms in column 4; the 
sign on the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level.  
These results have two important limitations: the selection of 1980 as the break 
point might seem arbitrary; and there is an important difference between identifying a 
temporal break in the oil (or fiscal reliance) coefficient, and demonstrating that oil’s net 
impact on democracy becomes negative in the post-break period.  While the interaction 
terms in Table 2 show evidence of the temporal break, to calculate the net effect of oil or 
fiscal reliance after 1980 we must simultaneously account for the effect of the interaction 
term, the direct measure of oil or fiscal reliance, and the change in these variables, and 
then calculate the appropriate standard error.21 
We address both concerns in Table 3.  Here we show the results of the same ECM 
as displayed in Table 2 column 3, but use every other year from 1976 to 1990 to specify 
the temporal break.  We also display the net effect of Total Oil Income on Polity 
following the break.  The models include all of the controls displayed in Table 2, column 
3, including the country and year fixed effects. 
Beginning in 1976, the interaction term has a negative coefficient; beginning in 
1980, this coefficient becomes statistically significant; and beginning in 1982, the net 
effect of oil becomes statistically significant and negative, and remains so for all 
subsequent break points in the table.   
                                                                                                                                            
increase spending on patronage (Ross 2001).  Haber and Menaldo’s Fiscal Reliance 
variable measures the first pathway but not the second, since it does not tell us the 
absolute size of government’s resource revenues – only their size relative to other 
revenue sources.  
21 For a more precise description of how we do this, see the notes to Table 3. 
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The Haber-Menaldo specification uses a one-year lag, which may bias downward 
the substantive effects of oil on democracy.  Haber and Menaldo are in effect asking 
whether a country’s level of oil revenues, or annual changes in its revenues, lead to 
changes in its regime type from one year to the next.  Many earlier studies consider the 
effects of oil over a longer period.  We think the focus on the one-year lagged effects of 
resource wealth is mistaken for two reasons. 
First, political institutions change slowly: many recent studies find that they are 
shaped by historical factors from decades or even centuries before.22  We would not 
expect short-term fluctuations in revenues to immediately cause fluctuations in regime 
types.  Haber and Menaldo partly address this issue, since in some specifications they 
allow the differenced resource variables to enter with two or several lags. However, they 
never allow the level of the Polity score – the error correction mechanism, which 
accounts for the long-run relationship between the levels of oil and democracy – to enter 
with longer lags. 
Second, it overlooks the fiscal practices of the oil-rich countries.  Most of them 
have stabilization funds, or sovereign wealth funds, which they use to smooth out annual 
fluctuations in their revenues.23   This allows them to buffer their annual budgets – and 
hence their political institutions – from the revenue shocks that Haber and Menaldo focus 
on.  Changes in revenues are more likely to affect government expenditures, and hence 
political pressures, over the medium-term. 
                                                
22 See, for example, North (1990); Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001); Treisman 
(2011). 
23 See, for example, Davis et al. (2003).  They also tend to incur unusually large debt 
loads when prices fall, which further cushions their regimes against popular uprisings 
(Nooruddin 2008). 
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Table 4 is identical to Table 3, except we move from one-year lags to five-year 
lags on all of the right hand side variables and consider the effect on the five-year change 
in the Polity score. Notice that the net effects of oil income on democracy grew almost 
five-fold, and become statistically significant several years earlier. This suggests that the 
marginal impact of a shift in the level of oil income per capita on the level of democracy 
accumulates over several years. 
Figure 6 displays these results graphically, using the five-year lag specification.  
The vertical axis shows the net effects of Total Oil Income on Polity in a given year, 
while the horizontal axis indicates the year of the break in each regression.  While the 
anti-democratic effects of oil become statistically significant around 1980, they reach 
their maximum impact in the mid-1980s. 
As we move away from the 1976-1990 range in either direction, the break 
becomes more difficult to identify: before 1976, it disappears entirely, and after 1990, it 
remains statistically significant but becomes weaker, as the number of post-break 
observations becomes smaller. 
Even though we employ the Haber-Menaldo models for heuristic purposes, we 
think a more plausible way to estimate the relationship between resource wealth and 
Polity scores – while still using the Haber-Menaldo data and controls – would be to drop 
the restriction that the resource and democracy variables are cointegrated (a restriction 
that, according to Haber and Menaldo, is generally violated) and use a dynamic fixed 
effects model.   
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We follow this strategy in Table 5, keeping all of the Haber-Menaldo controls, 
including both country and year fixed effects.24  With a one-year lag, the interaction term 
carries a negative sign and is now statistically significant (column 2); moving to a five 
year lag makes the term’s absolute value more than four times larger (column 3).  Since 
we have dropped the error-correction framework, we can also collapse the data into five 
year panels (column 4).  Even though this leaves us with just five panels in the post-1980 
period, the coefficient remains negative and significant at the 5 percent level. 
In Table 6 we repeat this exercise using the Fiscal Reliance measure and Haber 
and Menaldo’s sample of 18 countries.  The results are similar: the post-1980 interaction 
term has a negative sign and is statistically significant with the one-year lag (column 2), 
five year lag (column 3), and with five year panels (column 4).  
The substantive effects of oil income on democracy in this model are large.25 
Taking the dynamic fixed effects model with a five year lag (Table 5, column 3) as our 
baseline, and using the 1980 temporal break, a one standard deviation rise in total oil 
income ($2618) leads to a one point reduction in the Polity score (using Haber and 
Menaldo’s 0-100 scale) over a five year period, and a 0.6 point reduction over the long 
run, once Polity has stabilized. 
                                                
24 Notice that the country fixed effects have different interpretations in the ECM and in 
the dynamic fixed effects model. In the ECM, the regressand is the differenced Polity 
score, hence the country fixed effects have the interpretation of average country specific 
changes in the Polity scores over the sample period. In the dynamic fixed effects model, 
the regressand is the level of the Polity score, implying that the fixed effects allow the 
levels of democracy to differ across countries for reasons not explained by the included 
set of covariates.   
25 We hasten to add that we do not think this is the correct way to model the effects of oil: 
other studies show that oil income keeps autocracies from transiting to democracy, but 
has no average effect on democracies (see footnote 7).  This implies that the effects of oil 
in both the ECM and the dynamic fixed effects models are biased towards zero, 
understating oil’s true effects. 
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When we move the temporal break to 1984, the effects are much larger – a drop 
of 4.7 points over five years, and a drop of 2.9 points in the long run.  At the sample 
mean of the Polity score (=45.7), our estimates imply that a one standard deviation rise in 
total oil income is associated with a 10.3 percent reduction in Polity in the short run and a 
6.3 percent reduction in the long run. 
Our results are further confirmed by the R2 statistics.  We illustrate this in Figure 
7, which plots the within-country R2 figures for the dynamic fixed effects model in the 
post-1945 sample, and with a five-year lag. 26  Without oil, the R2 figure is 0.46; adding 
Haber and Menaldo’s Total Oil Income variable lifts it very slightly to 0.4605.  When we 
interact the oil measure with different temporal breaks, the R2 rises from 0.4609 (when 
the break is 1976) to 0.4634 (when the break is 1984), and then declines from 1986 and 
onward. 
This suggests that at its maximum, oil explains 0.34 percent of the total within-
country variation in democracy around the world, in the 1945-2006 period.  Including the 
break boosts the explanatory power of oil approximately seven-fold. 
It also implies that oil income has substantial within-country explanatory power.  
Assuming oil only begins to affect democracy after about 1984, its effects are limited to 
about 46 percent of the country-year observations in the 1945-2006 period.27  About 25 
percent of the countries post-1984 are consistent oil producers and hence susceptible to 
the resource curse.  This means that oil’s explanatory power is confined to about twelve 
percent of the country-years in the sample, suggesting that within these post-1984 oil 
                                                
26 The R2 approach is discussed in Western and Kleykamp (2004).  In the Appendix, we 
show that using the full sample, going back to 1800, makes little difference (Figure A3). 
27 The panel is unbalanced, and the post-1945 regression with a five-year lag includes 
6978 observations in total, of which 3242 are post-1984 observations. 
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producers, oil alone explains about 3.0 percent of the total variation in their Polity scores.  
If the effects are further limited to the roughly two-thirds of the oil rich countries that are 
authoritarian – as suggested by several recent studies28 – then oil income would explain 
about 4.5 percent of the total variation in Polity scores within the affected countries.29  
In some regressions, the non-interacted measure of resource wealth (either Total 
Oil Income or Fiscal Reliance) still carries a positive sign, and is statistically significant, 
after the interaction term is included.  Does this imply that, before nationalization, more 
oil led to more democracy? 
We think this is unclear.  In the large majority of countries before the 1970’s oil 
only played a minor role in the economy, as indicated in Figure 1. Hence, it is less 
plausible that the relationship between oil and democracy can be given a causal 
interpretation in this period; it might be spurious.  The rich democracies invest much 
more in their extractive sectors than the rest of the world, which could mean that more 
democracy leads to higher levels of oil production, not the reverse (Ross 2012).  Since a 
country’s investments vary over time, they are not controlled for by country fixed effects. 
We consider this an unresolved puzzle for future studies.  
 
5. Robustness 
We have already shown that our results hold with each of Haber and Menaldo’s measures 
of resource wealth; that they do not change when we use different years between 1980 
and 1990 to specify the temporal break, or move from one to five year lags; and that they 
                                                
28 See footnote 7. 
29 In the appendix (Figure A1), we show the same pattern emerges in the full 1800-2006 
sample, and the substantive effects are only slightly reduced. 
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also hold in a dynamic fixed effects model with all of the Haber Menaldo controls, 
whether or not the data are collapsed into five-year panels. 
Our results are also unchanged if we vary the size of our lags: in the appendix, we 
replicate our results with the error-correction model, using both three and seven year lags 
in place of the five year lags in Table 2.  Nor do our findings change if we collapse our 
data into three or seven year panels, instead of the five year panels we employ in the 
dynamic fixed effects model in Table 4; in fact, moving from the five to the seven year 
panel causes the coefficient on the interaction term to rise by about 20 percent in size and 
gain significance at the 1 percent level, while the coefficient on the non-interacted oil 
term drops in size by about two-thirds, and loses significance at conventional levels.  We 
display all of these results in Table A1 of the appendix.  If we further lengthen the panels 
to cover ten or twenty year periods, it becomes more difficult to identify the temporal 
break, since we have too few data points after 1980 to make meaningful inferences.   
 Toward the end of their paper, Haber and Menaldo employ a new dependent 
variable, Net Polity, which represents the difference in Polity scores between oil-
producing countries and other countries in the same region that are not reliant on oil or 
other resources.  This allows them, they suggest, “to see if the yearly differences in the 
changes in Polity between treatment and control groups are a function of changes in the 
dose of oil, after controlling for the same set of covariates as in the previous regressions 
(23).” 
 We note above that we consider these tests less informative, since the resource 
curse is a theory about the effects levels of, not changes in, oil wealth.  Still, in the 
appendix we run an additional set of dynamic fixed effects models, taking Net Polity as 
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the dependent variable, including all of the Haber Menaldo controls, and using either a 
five year lag or collapsing the data into five year panels. We run one set of tests with 
Total Oil Income as the key independent variable, and another set with the Fiscal 
Reliance measure.  We find the same pattern as before: the post-1980 interaction term is 
always negative, and in three of these four tests, statistically significant (Table A2). 
Some observers might worry that our results are biased by including the post-
1980 interaction term without also including the post-1980 dummy by itself.  This 
concern is unwarranted, since the models already include a full set of year dummies, and 
a post-1980 term will be perfectly collinear with them.  Still, in the appendix we replicate 
Table 2 after adding a post-1980 dummy; the results are identical to those already 
reported in Table 2 (Table A3).   
Finally, we show that in the dynamic fixed effects model – like in the error 
correction model – our results are similar when we move the temporal break to later years 
(A4).  When the break is in 1976, the interaction term has a negative coefficient that is 
not statistically significant; in 1978, the coefficient gains statistical significance; and 
beginning in 1982, the net effect of oil income on democracy becomes negative and 
statistically significant, and remains so in each subsequent year.  
All of our empirical models represent extensions and modifications of the Haber 
Menaldo specification.  An alternative way to investigate the timing of the break is to 
model the marginal effect of oil income as a function of time. In the dynamic fixed 
effects model, this can be done by interacting the oil income variable with the time (year) 
variable, and, based on the resulting estimates, calculate in which year the marginal effect 
of oil income is predicted to change from positive to negative.  This type of analysis is 
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potentially sensitive to the specific modeling assumptions made – with respect to the 
structure of time dependence, and to the existence and the timing of trend breaks. Still, 
when we estimate different versions of this type of model – using the same range of lag 
structures and trend breaks that we employ with the Haber-Menaldo models – we observe 
that the marginal effect of oil declines after 1960, and changes from positive to negative 
somewhere between 1975 and 1985 – precisely in line with our other estimations.30 
  
Conclusion  
Our analysis finds that the anti-democratic effects of oil are only evident after the 1970s.  
We argue this reflects the global shift in the control of oil rents in the 1970s, as 
governments renegotiated contracts with foreign oil companies, and often expropriated 
their assets. There is little to admire in the behavior of the major oil companies in the 
developing world in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s; yet the resource nationalism that swept 
the resource-rich countries in the 1970s had its own perverse consequences, empowering 
autocrats and insulating them against the democratic waves of the 1980s and 1990s.  
 Our study complements recent efforts to better specify the conditions under which 
natural resource wealth leads to less democracy.31 Several earlier studies argue that the 
resource curse is conditional on the initial regime type of the affected country; we suggest 
it is also contingent on the state’s ability to capture resource rents, which was only widely 
true after the late 1970s.  Our findings have broad implications for the study of the 
resource curse, which is often treated as a time-invariant truth – one that should apply 
                                                
30 Results available from authors. 
31 See, for example, Smith 2004; Ulfelder 2007; Dunning 2008; Morrison 2009; Clark, 
Poast, and Wiens 2012. 
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equally to states in the 1950s and the 2000s.32  They are also consistent with a recent 
study by Jones Luong and Weinthal (2010), which argues that oil wealth only leads to 
harmful outcomes when the government has a dominant role in the oil industry.  We hope 
it helps point the way towards policy interventions that can counteract the resource curse: 
if its has been produced by government policies, it might be easier to fix.  
Our paper partly refutes, and partly builds on, Haber and Menaldo’s important 
study.  We try to explain why Haber and Menaldo failed to observe the pattern we 
identify: because they made invalid inferences from their longitudinal analysis of 
resource-rich countries; and because they paid insufficient attention to changes in the 
underlying conditions that give oil its anti-democratic properties. 
Our analysis also highlights some of the pitfalls of Haber and Menaldo’s approach 
to comparative analysis.  After stressing the dangers of omitted variable bias, they 
suggest:  
When a hypothesis is not about static differences between countries but about 
complex changes that take place within countries over time, long-run historical 
datasets provide a better fit between theory and evidence (25). 
We agree with their criticism – the dangers of omitted variable bias and reverse causality 
are ubiquitous – but we think these dangers are widely recognized, and that Haber and 
Menaldo’s proposed solution carries its own dangers.   
Long-run historical datasets have intrinsic value, and we applaud Haber and 
Menaldo for their data collection efforts.  But it is not possible to make inferences about 
the effects of a treatment by only observing a treated population over time; the treatment 
                                                
32 At least, by scholars who employ cross-national quantitative methods.  Scholars who 
carry out country-level quantitative analyses are often more sensitive to historical factors. 
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group must be compared to a control group, even if non-random assignment introduces 
the danger of omitted variable bias.  Lengthening the period in which the treated group is 
observed does not change this. 
It is also unwise to assume that the relationships among key variables – like oil 
wealth and political power – are fixed over time, without paying close attention to 
potential changes in the conditions that affect the causal relationship.  Nor does it make 
sense to imply that theories about causal relationships, like the resource curse, are only 
valid today if they were also true in centuries past.  Most meaningful claims in political 
science are probably specific to a set of historical conditions that change over time.  Just 
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Figure 1: Number of significant oil producers, 1800-2006 
 










Figure 2: Polity scores of current oil and non-oil states, 1945-2006 
 
The solid black line shows the mean polity score (on a 0-100 scale) of all countries with 
at least $100 in oil income per capita; the broken line shows the polity scores of all other 
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Figure 3: Polity scores of 1960 oil and non-oil states, 1945-2006 
 
The solid black line shows the mean polity scores of the 11 countries that in 1960 
produced at least $100 in oil income per capita; the broken line shows the polity scores of 
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Figure 4: Acts of Expropriation in the Petroleum Sector, 1960-93 
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Figure 5: Polity scores of oil-reliant and non oil-reliant countries, 1945-2006 
  
The solid black line shows the mean polity score (on a 0-100 scale) of the 34 oil-
producing countries that Haber and Menaldo identify as “resource reliant”; the broken 
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Figure 6: Net effect of Total Oil Income on Polity in Error Correction Model 
 
 
Based on the Haber and Menaldo error correction model with a five year lag; the dashed 
lines represent the 95 percent confidence interval.   See Table 3 for a full explanation of 











Figure 7: R2 statistics for different models and break years, post-1945 sample 
 











Without oil With oil Difference
1800-2002 1.23 1.58 0.35
1940-1980 1.67 1.74 0.07
1981-2002 3.70 1.56 -2.14*
Without oil With oil Difference
1800-2002 1.26 1.22 -0.04
1940-1980 1.66 1.90 0.24
1981-2002 3.51 0.74 -2.78*
   
Notes: * significant at 5% in a two-tailed t-test.
Table 1: Annual likelihood of a democratic transition (percent)
All oil producers (oil income>$100 per capita)
Major oil producers (oil income>$500 per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable ∆ Polity ∆ Polity ∆ Polity ∆ Polity
Model ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE
Sample FULL FULL FULL FULL
Polity in levels t-1 -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.109*** -0.110***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.021) (0.021)
Total Oil Income t-1 0.055*** 0.048**
(0.019) (0.024)
TOI t-1 × Post 1980 -0.147***
(0.052)
∆ Total Oil Income -0.020 -0.059**
(0.021) (0.027)
∆ TOI×Post 1980 -0.048
(0.036)
Log (Per capita income) t-1 -0.279 -0.273 0.845 0.324
(0.319) (0.317) (0.734) (0.718)
Civil War t-1 0.065 0.057 1.435 1.607
(0.448) (0.448) (1.181) (1.181)
Regional Democratic Diffusion t-1 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.012 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.021) (0.021)
Global Democratic Diffusion t-1 0.058** 0.059** -0.050 -0.076*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.037)
∆ Log (Per capita income) 1.289 1.199 -3.698 -3.391
(1.734) (1.736) (3.349) (3.371)
∆ Regional Democratic Diffusion 0.375*** 0.375*** 0.168** 0.167**
(0.070) (0.070) (0.076) (0.076)
∆ Global Democratic Diffusion -0.277** -0.277** 0.113 0.120
(0.109) (0.109) (0.112) (0.111)
Fiscal Reliance t-1 0.023 0.047**
(0.016) (0.018)
FR t-1 × Post 1980 -0.057***
(0.019)
∆ Fiscal Reliance 0.049** 0.042**
(0.020) (0.018)
∆ FR × Post 1980 0.004
(0.023)
Observations 10,195 10,195 1,132 1,132
R-squared 0.0976 0.0977 0.168 0.173
Number of groups 163 163 18 18
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: The polity score is normalized to run from 0 to 100. Discroll-Kray standard errors (DKSE) in parentheses. Constant term not 
reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: Replication of Haber Menaldo Error Correction Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable ∆ Polity ∆ Polity ∆ Polity ∆ Polity ∆ Polity ∆ Polity ∆ Polity ∆ Polity
Model ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE
Year of Post Year dummy 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Total Oil Income t-1 0.096*** 0.076*** 0.048* 0.022 0.011 0.018 0.025 0.034
(0.035) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
TOI t-1 × Post Year dummy -0.061 -0.038 -0.147*** -0.236*** -0.304*** -0.291*** -0.270*** -0.217***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.052) (0.072) (0.066) (0.065) (0.062) (0.059)
Net Post Year effect of TOI t-1 0.036 0.038 -0.099 -0.214** -0.292*** -0.273*** -0.245*** -0.183**
(0.029) (0.034) (0.062) (0.085) (0.081) (0.078) (0.073) (0.072)
Notes: The Polity score is normalized to run from 0 to 100. DKSE refers to Discroll-Kray standard errors, reported in parentheses. The regressions in the table reproduce the regression in Table 2, Column 4, but with 
different entry years to identify the breaks in the coefficient and the effect of Total Oil Income t-1 (TOI t-1).  All regressions thus include the full battery of controls, including country and year fixed effects. In "TOI t-
1 × Post Year dummy", "Year" is indicated in the header of the columns (Year of the Post Year dummy). "Net Post Year effect of TOI t-1" refers to the estimated effect of the one year lagged level of Total Oil 
Income on the consequent one year change in Polity during the period of the Post Year dummy; a negative effect is an indication of a negative long-run relationship between the two variables. The coefficients of the 
"Net Post Year effect of TOI t-1" and the associated standard errors are estimated by employing Pre Year+1 instead of the Post Year dummies (e.g., a Pre 1981 dummy instead of a Post 1980 dummy, and so on) 
interacted with the TOI t-1 and ∆TOI variables, and is then given by the coefficients and the standard errors of the uninteracted TOI t-1 variable. For convenience, only the main coefficients of interest (and their 
associated standard errors) are reported in the table. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: Error Correction Model using different temporal breaks in the coefficient, and in the overall effect, of Total Oil Income.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable ∆5 Polity ∆5 Polity ∆5 Polity ∆5 Polity ∆5 Polity ∆5 Polity ∆5 Polity ∆5 Polity
Model ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE
Year of Post Year dummy 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Total Oil Income t-5 0.252** 0.203** 0.049 -0.056 -0.080 -0.032 0.019 0.058
(0.101) (0.081) (0.068) (0.058) (0.058) (0.062) (0.068) (0.069)
TOI t-5 × Post Year dummy -0.364** -0.359*** -0.535** -1.037*** -1.374*** -1.257*** -1.073*** -0.955***
(0.150) (0.115) (0.214) (0.277) (0.186) (0.194) (0.184) (0.167)
Net Post Year effect of TOI t-5 -0.089 -0.157 -0.486* -1.093*** -1.453*** -1.284*** -1.042*** -0.893***
(0.132) (0.134) (0.252) (0.309) (0.222) (0.237) (0.223) (0.211)
Notes: Same specification as in Table 3, but with differences and lags of five years instead of one. See Table 3 for details. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Error Correction Model using different temporal breaks in the coefficient, and in the overall effect, of Total Oil Income.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Polity Polity Polity Polity
Model OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Sample, lag-length (s) Full, s=1 Full, s=1 Full, s=5 Five year 
avgs., s=1
Polity in levels t-s 0.917*** 0.917*** 0.595*** 0.983***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.033) (0.004)
Total Oil Income t-s 0.050** 0.047** 0.121 0.042***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.076) (0.015)
TOI t-s × Post 1980 -0.121** -0.508** -0.098**
(0.051) (0.244) (0.042)
Log (Per capita income) t-s -0.347 -0.348 0.423 -0.399
(0.435) (0.433) (1.974) (0.261)
Civil War t-s 0.009 0.002 -1.450 -0.897*
(0.476) (0.477) (1.748) (0.541)
Regional Democratic Diffusion t-s 0.007 0.007 0.041 -0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.043) (0.006)
Global Democratic Diffusion t-s 0.123 0.124 0.441 -0.220
(0.077) (0.077) (0.288) (0.218)
Observations 10,196 10,196 9,546 2,194
R-squared 0.891 0.891 0.570 0.979
Number of countries 163 163 161 163
country FE YES YES YES YES
time FE YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Polity Polity Polity Polity
Model OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Sample, lag-length (s) Full, s=1 Full, s=1 Full, s=5 Five year avgs., s=1
Polity in levels t-s 0.896*** 0.895*** 0.462*** 0.937***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.137) (0.022)
Fiscal Reliance t-s 0.014 0.040* 0.182* 0.033
(0.017) (0.022) (0.091) (0.022)
FR t-s × Post 1980 -0.061** -0.191* -0.055**
(0.027) (0.100) (0.025)
Log (Per capita income) t-s 1.145 0.558 2.128 0.309
(0.959) (0.845) (4.752) (0.894)
Civil War t-s 1.413 1.603 2.841 -0.620
(0.993) (0.991) (2.922) (1.553)
Regional Democratic Diffusion t-s 0.005 -0.010 0.037 -0.021
(0.034) (0.029) (0.141) (0.024)
Global Democratic Diffusion t-s -0.017 -0.032 -0.490 -1.621
(0.049) (0.053) (0.339) (3.008)
Observations 1,138 1,138 1,069 244
R-squared 0.881 0.881 0.552 0.972
Number of countries 18 18 18 18
country FE YES YES YES YES
time FE YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Dynamic Fixed Effects Model. Total Oil Income.
Notes: The polity score is normalized to run from 0 to 100. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
"Five year avgs." refers to the sample where the full sample is collapsed into a sample of consecutive five year averages. 
Constant term not reported.
Table 6: Dynamic Fixed Effects Model. Fiscal Reliance.
Notes: The polity score is normalized to run from 0 to 100. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. 
"Five year avgs." refers to the sample where the full sample is collapsed into a sample of consecutive five year averages. 
Constant term not reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable ∆s Polity ∆s Polity ∆s Polity Polity Polity Polity
Model ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Sample, lag-length (s) FULL, s=5 FULL, s=3 FULL, s=7
Five year avgs., 
s=1
Three year avgs., 
s=1
Seven year avgs., 
s=1
Polity in levels t-s -0.416*** -0.268*** -0.531*** 0.983*** 0.970*** 0.990***
(0.023) (0.017) (0.028) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Total Oil Income t-s 0.049 0.064 0.046 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.012
(0.068) (0.055) (0.106) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
TOI t-s × Post 1980 -0.535** -0.354** -0.593** -0.098** -0.137*** -0.119***
(0.214) (0.156) (0.264) (0.042) (0.044) (0.035)
∆s Total Oil Income -0.055 -0.047 -0.019
(0.063) (0.046) (0.062)
∆s TOI×Post 1980 0.002 -0.013 0.000
(0.004) (0.024) (0.001)
Log (Per capita income) t-s 0.209 -0.256 1.037 -0.399 -0.512* -0.441*
(0.997) (0.733) (1.318) (0.261) (0.299) (0.243)
Civil War t-s -1.268 -0.814 -0.940 -0.897* -0.407 -0.946*
(0.953) (0.745) (1.069) (0.541) (0.438) (0.543)
Regional Democratic Diffusion t-s 0.153*** 0.096*** 0.190*** -0.009 -0.005 -0.008
(0.024) (0.017) (0.033) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Global Democratic Diffusion t-s 0.505*** 0.135*** 0.547*** -0.220 0.155 -0.133
(0.093) (0.048) (0.123) (0.218) (0.764) (0.228)
∆s Log (Per capita income) -2.704 -2.080 -2.728*
(1.717) (2.017) (1.472)
∆s Regional Democratic Diffusion 0.500*** 0.443*** 0.558***
(0.064) (0.068) (0.061)
∆s Global Democratic Diffusion -0.163** 0.349*** -0.171**
(0.069) (0.124) (0.070)
Observations 9,545 9,869 9,223 2,194 3,466 1,593
R-squared 0.316 0.218 0.396 0.979 0.961 0.984
Number of groups 161 162 161 163 163 163
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: The polity score is normalized to run from 0 to 100. Discroll-Kray standard errors (DKSE) in parentheses. Constant term not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A1: Results using 3, 5 and 7 year lags, and 3, 5, and 7 year panels
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable Net Polity Net Polity Net Polity Net Polity Net Polity Net Polity
Model OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Sample, lag-length (s) Full, s=5 Five year avgs., s=1
Five year avgs., 
s=1 Full, s=5
Five year avgs., 
s=1
Five year avgs., 
s=1
Net Polity in levels t-s 0.534*** 0.972*** 0.972*** 0.404*** 0.935*** 0.933***
(0.035) (0.007) (0.007) (0.123) (0.018) (0.017)
Total Oil Income t-s 0.100 0.051*** 0.058***
(0.076) (0.016) (0.019)
TOI t-s × Post 1980 -0.277** -0.096***
(0.123) (0.036)
Log (Per capita income) t-s 3.740* -0.134 -0.152 5.362 1.116 0.571
(2.083) (0.300) (0.302) (4.475) (0.942) (0.850)
Civil War t-s -1.145 -0.592 -0.601 5.974** -0.189 0.112
(1.663) (0.485) (0.485) (2.797) (1.362) (1.335)
Regional Democratic Diffusion t-s -0.334*** 0.000 -0.001 -0.353** -0.023 -0.037
(0.044) (0.006) (0.006) (0.155) (0.024) (0.024)
Global Democratic Diffusion t-s -0.964*** 0.102 0.106 -1.078** -1.721 -1.395
(0.320) (0.124) (0.125) (0.398) (2.663) (2.588)
Fiscal Reliance t-s 0.191* 0.007 0.033
(0.093) (0.021) (0.024)
FR t-s × Post 1980 -0.165 -0.056**
(0.104) (0.024)
Observations 9,454 2,181 2,181 1,063 243 243
R-squared 0.317 0.955 0.955 0.344 0.957 0.958
Number of countries 161 163 163 18 18 18
country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
time FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A2: Dynamic Fixed Effects Model. Dependent variable is Net Polity.
Notes: The polity score is normalized to run from 0 to 100. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the country level. "Five year avgs." refers to the sample where the full sample is 
collapsed into a sample of consecutive five year averages. Constant term not reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable ∆s Polity ∆s Polity ∆s Polity ∆s Polity
Model ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE ECM DKSE
Sample, lag-length (s) FULL, s=1 FULL, s=1 FULL, s=1 FULL, s=1
Polity in levels t-s -0.087*** -0.087*** -0.109*** -0.109***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.021) (0.021)
Total Oil Income t-s 0.055*** 0.048**
(0.019) (0.024)
TOI t-s × Post 1980 -0.147***
(0.052)
∆s Total Oil Income -0.020 -0.059**
(0.021) (0.027)
∆s TOI×Post 1980 -0.048
(0.036)
Post 1980 dummy 5.703*** -0.668
(0.471) (1.581)
Log (Per capita income) t-s -0.279 -0.273 0.845 0.324
(0.319) (0.317) (0.734) (0.718)
Civil War t-s 0.065 0.057 1.435 1.607
(0.448) (0.448) (1.181) (1.181)
Regional Democratic Diffusion t-s 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.012 -0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.021) (0.021)
Global Democratic Diffusion t-s 0.058** 0.059** -0.050 -0.076*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.035) (0.037)
∆s Log (Per capita income) 1.289 1.199 -3.698 -3.391
(1.734) (1.736) (3.349) (3.371)
∆s Regional Democratic Diffusion 0.375*** 0.375*** 0.168** 0.167**
(0.070) (0.070) (0.076) (0.076)
∆s Global Democratic Diffusion -0.277** -0.277** 0.113 0.120
(0.109) (0.109) (0.112) (0.111)
Fiscal Reliance t-s 0.023 0.047**
(0.016) (0.018)
FR t-s × Post 1980 -0.057***
(0.019)
∆s Fiscal Reliance 0.049** 0.042**
(0.020) (0.018)
∆s FR × Post 1980 0.004
(0.023)
Observations 10,195 10,195 1,132 1,132
R-squared 0.098 0.098 0.168 0.174
Number of groups 163 163 18 18
Country FE YES YES YES YES
Time FE YES YES YES YES
Notes: The polity score is normalized to run from 0 to 100. Standard errors in parentheses, where the baseline is the conventional OLS 
standard errors, and DKSE refers to Discroll-Kray standard errors. Constant term not reported.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A3: Including the Post 1980 dummy in the Table 2 regressions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity Polity
Model OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Entry year of Post Year dummy 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Total Oil Income t-5 0.268*** 0.257*** 0.121 -0.029 -0.090 -0.047 0.011 0.050
(0.096) (0.090) (0.076) (0.090) (0.082) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084)
TOI t-5 × Post Year dummy -0.197 -0.224** -0.508** -1.223*** -1.690*** -1.574*** -1.288*** -1.082***
(0.096) (0.097) (0.244) (0.391) (0.439) (0.464) (0.430) (0.412)
Net Post Year effect of TOI t-5 0.070 0.033 -0.388 -1.252*** -1.780*** -1.622*** -1.277*** -1.032**
(0.085) (0.091) (0.285) (0.455) (0.493) (0.518) (0.482) (0.464)
Notes: The regressions in the table reproduce the regression in Table 4, Column 3, but with different entry years to identify the breaks in the coefficient and the effect of Total Oil Income t-5 (TOI t-5).  All 
regressions include the full battery of controls, including country and year fixed effects; same standard errors and procedure to calculate the Net Post Year effect as in Table 3.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




Figure A1: Polity scores of 1970 oil and non-oil states, 1945-2006 
 
The solid black line shows the mean polity scores of the 16 countries that in 1970 
produced at least $100 in oil income per capita; the broken line shows the polity scores of 
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Figure A2: Polity scores of major 1970 oil and non-oil states, 1945-2006 
 
The solid black line shows the mean polity scores of the 11 countries that in 1970 
produced at least $500 in oil income per capita; the broken line shows the polity scores of 
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Figure A3: R2 statistics for different models and break years, full sample 
 
Based on the dynamic fixed effects model with a five year lag. 
 
